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In re WALTER NASH on Habeas Corpus. 
[1] Criminal Law-Rights of Accused-Aid of Counsel.-Defend-
ant was not denied effective assistance of counsel on the 
ground that his lawyer failed to object to the introduction of 
allegedly ill('gally obtained evidence where the articles de-
fendant claimed were seized illegally and improperly admitted 
in evidence were observed in his room by police officers when 
they entered lawfully to arrest defendant, and where the 
police officers properly testified to observing the articles, but 
it did not appear that such articles were seized at the time 
of the arrest or were ever taken from defendant's apart-
nlent, or that such articles were offered or introduced in evi-
dence. 
[2] ld.-Rights of Accused-Aid of Counsel.-In a rape prosecu-
tion, defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel 
on the ground that his lawyer failed to impeach the prosecut-. 
ing witness by introducing evidence that she was on parole for 
another criminal offense at the time of the trial and committed 
burglary four days after she testified where the parole arose 
out of a juvenile court adjudication, the facts of which were 
not admissible to impeach the prosecutrix, and where the al-
leged burglary took place after the verdict finding defendant 
guilty had been returned. 
(3] Id.-Appeal-Appointment of Counsel.-Where counsel is ap-
pointed to represent a defendant on appeal, thoroughly studies 
• [1] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 146 et seq.; Am.Jur., Crim-
)Dal Law (1st ed § 167 et seq). 
licK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Criminal Law, § 107; [3] Criminal 
Law, § 1048.5. --The agreement was made on April 1, 1958, and plaintitr "became a 
director of RF.I. on Moy I, 1958. 
" 
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the record, consults with defendant and trial counsel, and coll~ 
Bcientiously concludes that there are no meritorious grounds Of' 
appeal, defendant's right to be represented by counsel on .p:' 
peal has been met, and if, thereafter, the appellate court i8' 
satisfied from its own review of the record in the light of any'J 
points raised by defendant personally that counsel's assessment 1\ 
of the record is correct, it need not appoint another lawyer to' 
represent defendant on appeal and may properly decide the \ 
appeal without oral argument. 
PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure release from, 
custody. Order to show cause discharged and writ denied. 
Walter Nash, in pro. per., and Harry A. Ackley, under 
appointment by the Supreme Court, for Petitioner. 
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, Doris H. Maier, Assistant 
Attorney General, and Roger E. Venturi, Deputy Attorney 
General, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-A jury found petitioner guilty of forcible 
rape (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. 3), and the trial court denied 
his motion for a new trial and sentenced him to prison. He 
appealed and requested that the District Court of Appeal for 
the Third Appellate District appoint counsel to represent 
him. That court appointed counsel who studied the record, 
consulted with petitioner, and interviewed petitioner's trial 
counsel and the trial court clerk and reporter. He then wrote 
to the appellate court and to petitioner stating that in his 
opinion there were no meritorious grounds of appeal. The 
appellate court also informed petitioner of his counsel's de-
termination and advised him that he might file a brief in 
propria persona. It denied his request for the appointment of 
other counsel on appeal. Thereafter petitioner filed an open-
ing brief, the Attorney General filed a reply brief, and peti-
tioner filed a closing brief. He wrote the counsel who bad ' 
been appointed to represent him on appeal and requested 
that he file a supplemental brief and argue the appeal orally. 
Counsel refused his requests, and the appeal was submitted 
without orel argument by either side. The appellate court 
affirmed the judgment (People v. Nash, 216 Cal.App.2d 491 
[31 Ca1.Rptr. 195]) and dl:'nied a rehearing. This court de-
nied a hearing. Petitioner then sought a writ of certiorari 
from the United States Supreme Court, and that court re-
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9 L.Ed.2d 811]. Thereafter on January 13, 1964, the United 
States Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of certi-
orari. (Nash v. California, 375 U.S.9SS [84 S.Ct. 522, 11 
L.Ed.2d 475].) 
On February IS, 1964, petitioner filed this petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus alleging that he had been denied his 
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel at his 
trial and on his appeal. We issued an order to show cause. 
At his trial petitioner admitted that he had had sexual 
intercourse with the prosecuting witness late at night in his 
automobile after they had visited various places during the 
course of the evening. He testified, however, that she consented 
to the act. She testified that she did not consent, that she 
attempted to escape across a muddy field, and that petitioner 
caugllt her and carried her back to his car and overcame her 
resistance by force. After the rape petitioner returned the 
prosecuting witness to her grandmother's home, where she 
was living. She immediately telephoned her mother in her 
grandmother's presence and stated that petitioner had raped 
her. The police were called, and the prosecuting witness di-
rected them to petitioner's apartment. It was then about 
3 a.m. Petitioner's car was parked outside and the hood was 
warm although the weather was cold and wet. One of the 
officers repeatedly knocked on petitioner's door and identi-
fied hin;tSelf, but he received no response. The noise aroused 
the landlady, who on learning why the officers were there, 
gave them a key to petitioner's apartment. They unlocked 
the door and went in. Petitioner had on pajama bottoms and 
a T-shirt, and the officers saw muddy slacks and damp and 
muddy shoes in the room. They told petitioner that the pros-
ecuting witness had accused him of rape and took him out-
side to the police car to confront her. She identified him as 
her assailant. Petitioner denied to the officers that he knew 
her and told them that he had not been out of the apartment 
since 5 p.m. on the day before. The officers arrested petitioner 
and took him to jail. 
It appears jrom the record that petitioner was forcefully 
and ably represented at his trial by the assistant public de-
fender. He contends, however" that he was denied effective 
assistance of counsel on the grounds that his counsel failed to 
object to the introduction of illegally obtained evidence and 
failed to introduce evidence to impeach the prosecuting wit-
ness. 
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[1] With respect to the assertedly illegally obtained evi-
dence, petitioner alleges in his petition that "The officers 
searched the defendant and his room, and after they found 
certain articles of clothing they placed him under arrest. The 
evidence from the search was introduced and admitted at 
petitioner's trial. The introduction of the evidence was not 
objected to." Neitller the officers nor the petitioner testified 
at the trial, however, that any search was made of petitioner's 
room, and the clothing the officers observed when they 
entered the room was neither offered nor introduced into evi-
dence. It was not seized at the time of the arrest and whether j 
it was ever taken from the apartment does not appear. The 
record establishes that the officers had reasonable cause to 
arrest petitioner before they entered his apartment. They 
lawfully entered his room to arrest him and could therefore 
properly testify to what they observed in the room. (PeopZe 
v. Roberts, 47 Cal.2d 374, 379 [303 P.2d 721].) If, as peti-
tioner contends, the officers conducted a search that could not 
be justified as incident to his lawful arrest, no evidence of it 
or its products was introduced at his trial. Accordingly, his 
contention that his counsel improperly failed to object to the 
introduction of illegally obtained evidence is totally devoid 
of merit. 
[2] 'Vith respect to counsel's assertcdly improper failure 
to introduce evidence to impeach the prosecuting witness, 
petitioner alleges that the prosecuting witness was on 
parole for another criminal offense at the time of the trial 
and committed burglary four days after she testified and that 
his counsel failed to introduce evidence of these facts. From 
the respondent's return it appears that the prosecuting wit-
ness was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court and commit-
ted to the custody of her mother about two months before the 
alleged rape. At the time she was .made a ward of the court 
she was just under 18 years of age and the adjudication was 
based on a finding that she had taken an automobile in viola-
tion of Vehicle Code, section 10851 and llad committed grand 
theft in violation of Penal Code, section 487, subdivision 1. 
The allef{ed burglary was from a parked automobile and took 
place after the verdict finding petitioner guilty was returned. 
The charge was later reduced to petty theft. 
In the absence of specih.l circumstances such as were pres-
ent in PeopZe v. Murphy, 59 Ca1.2d 818, 831-832 [31 Cal. 
Rptr. 306, 382 P.2d 346J, evidence of the juvenile court ad-
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admissible to impeach the prosecuting witness. (PeopZev. 
Hoffman, 199 Cal. 155, 159 [248 P. 504] ; PeopZe v. Han\iZton, 
60 Cal.2d 105, 116-117 (32 Ca1.Rptr. 4, 383 P.2d 412] ; Peo-
pZe v. Gomez, 152 Cal.App.2d 139, 142-143 [313 P.2d 58]; 
Welt. & 1nst. Code, § 503; Code Civ. Proc., § 2051.) More-
over, defense counsel obviously could not introduce evidencc 
of a burglary that had not yet occurred. He made the best 
nsehe could of the prosecuting witness's record by pointing 
out to the trial court that her record was before the court in 
the probation report and urging that in the light of t11at 
record, the court should resolve the con1licts in the evidence 
in petitioner's favor and grant the motion for a new trial. 
[3] Petitioner contends that he was denied effective rep-
resentation of counsel on appeal when the counsel appointed 
to represent him informed the court that he could find no 
meritorious grounds of appeal and refused to file a brief or· 
argue the case orally. He contends that the appellate court 
should have appointed another counsel to represent him or, 
at least, formally relieved counsel of his assignment and 
offered petitioner the opportunity personally to present oral 
as well as written argument. 
In Douglas v. State of California, 372 U.S. 353 [83 S.Ct. 
814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811], the United States Supreme Court held 
t]lat it was a denial of equal protection of the laws to refuse 
to appoint counsel to represent an indigent defendant on his 
appeal from a criminal conviction. (See also Vasquez v. Dis-
trict CoUrt of AppeaZ, 59 Ca1.2d 585, 586-587 [30 Ca1.Rptr. 
467, 381 P.2d 203].) We believe that the requirement of the 
Douglas case is met, however, when, as in this ease, counsel is 
appointed to represent the defendant on appeal, thorougllly 
studies the record, consults with the defendant and trial 
counsel, and conscientiously concludes that there are no meri-
torious grounds of appeal. If thereafter the appeUate court is 
satisfied from its own review of the record in the light of allY 
points raised by the defendant personally t11at counsel's as-
sessment of the record is correct, it need not appoint another 
counsel· to represent the defendant on appeal and may prop-
erly decide the appeal without oral argument. (See Federal 
Commu'1licati.ons Com. v. WJR, 337 U.S. 265, 276, 283-284 [69 
S.Ct. 1097, 93 IJ:Ed. 1353,1360, 1364-1365] ; Dyke Water Co. 
v. Public Utilities Com., 56 Ca1.2d 105, 125 [14 Cal.Rptr. 310, 
363 P.2d 326].) 
This procedure, which was adopted by the District Court of 
Appeal in this case, afforded petitioner substantially the 
) 
496 IN BE NASH [61 C.2d 
same representation by counsel on appeal as is afforded in-
digent federal prisoners seeking to appeal in forma pauperis. 
(See Coppedge v.United States, 369 U.S. 438, 446 [82 S.Ot; 
917, 8 L.Ed.2d 21, 28-29J i Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 
674, 675 [78 S.Ot. 974, 2 L.Ed.2d 1060, 1061]; Johnson v. 
United States, 352 U.S. 565, 566 [77 8.Ct. 550, 1 L.Ed.2d 593, 
594] ; United States v. Pravato, 282 F.2d 587, 591; Porter v. 
United States, 272 F.2d695 i see also State ex reI. White v. 
Hilgemann, 218 Ind. 572, 578-579 [34 N.E.2d 129] i People v. 
Brown, 55 Ca1.2d 64, 73-74 [9 Cal.Rptr. 816, 357 P.2d 1072], 
concurring opinion i People v. Linden, 204 Cal.App.2d 745 
[22 Ca1.Rptr. 633].) Admittedly, it does not insure exact 
equality between indigent. defendants and those who have 
ample funds to retain counsel, for undoubtedly a defendant 
with sufficient funds could ultimately find counsel to brief 
and argue even the most frivolous appeal. Exact equality, 
however, is impossible to attain (see McGarty v. O'Brien, 
188 F.2d 151, 155, 157 i United States v. Baldi, 192 F.2d 540, 
547, affd. 344 U.S. 561, 568 [73 S.Ct. 391, 97 L.Ed. 549, 
556] ), and the United States Supreme Court recognized in 
the Douglas case that it is not required; that only "invidious 
discrimination" denies equal protection. (Douglas v. State 
of California, 372 U.S. 353, 356-357 [83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 
811, 814] ; see also Norvell v. Illinois, 373 U.S. 420, 423-424 
[83 8. Ct. 1366, 10 L.Ed.2d 456, 459].) Competent counsel 
was appointed to represent petitioner on appeal. He was not 
subject to invidious discrimination because neither that coun-
sel nor the District Court of Appeal could discover a merito-
rious ground of appeal and the court therefore refused to 
appoint another counsel to represent him. 
The order to show cause is discharged and the petition is 
denied. 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., Tob-
riner, J., and Peek, J., concurred. 
